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Western Allies Debate Method of German Rearmament

WASHINGTON—The Truman Administration is ready to abandon the policy for demilitarizing Germany which it adopted in 1945 with its principal allies of that time, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Many high officers in the American armed forces have long advocated the rearming of West Germany, but they were out of step with the State Department until Secretary Dean Acheson said on September 6 that the strength of West Germany should be brought into the defense program for Western Europe. Mr. Acheson was to discuss the matter with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman at their conference in New York City which opened on September 12. The case for demilitarization finally collapsed in Washington under the pressure of the Korean war, which each day strengthens the determination of the Administration to increase the military strength of the non-Soviet world. The growth of the armed police force (*Bereitschaften*) in Eastern Germany since the United States, Britain and France on May 23 protested to the Soviet Union against its existence and the prospective modification of the Occupation Statute for the purpose of increasing the authority of the West German government in home and foreign affairs also contributed to the change in policy.

What Kind of Rearmament?

The difficult question is what form German rearmament should take. Should the West German government have the privilege of raising and controlling an army? Or should a West German force be created only as a part of a Western European army?

Britain opposes the establishment of a national army directly under the control of the West German government. It also apparently opposes the development of a German armaments industry. Yet the possibility of giving West Germany a place within a general European force seems remote because the plans for creating such a force do not exist. With West German representatives participating, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in August adopted 89 to 5 a resolution for the creation of a "unified European army." Winston Churchill, author of the resolution, indicated that he meant West Germany to be included in the proposed continental force. The vote on the resolution did not bind the governments of the nations represented in the Assembly, and the recommendation has not been acted upon. The military committee of the North Atlantic pact countries, which met in London soon after the Assembly, stressed the development of separate national defense forces according to a central plan rather than the establishment of an international army. Some American officials suggest that the United States should prod Western European nations (all of which except West Germany and Spain are Atlantic pact nations) into carrying out Mr. Churchill's proposal. A European army incorporating German units would, in their opinion, give Europe the advantages of a military partnership with Germany while eliminating possible disadvantages, for German chauvinists could not easily exploit German units over which the Bonn government would have no direct control.

Another obstacle to the implementation of the new United States policy is the attitude of the Germans themselves toward rearmament. The American information program in Germany has included criticisms of German militarism. Carlo Schmid, a leading German Social Democrat, commenting on the Churchill resolution, told the Council of Europe that "the day when the first German armored division is created between the Rhine and the Elbe, the Russians will have their best pretext for attacking." Although most of the Germans attending the Assembly supported Churchill, many Germans had opposed their country's participation in the Council of Europe. When the lower house of the West German Parliament on June 14 debated the bill accepting the invitation of the Council to join as an associate member, the vote on it was 220 in favor to 152 against.

Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the West German state, however, apparently favors the establishment of a German force. "I am opposed in principle to any remilitarization of the West German Republic and, therefore, also to the establishment of a new German army," he said on December 4, 1949, but three days later he declared that it should be possible for Germans to take part in a European army. When Dr. Adenauer recommended on August 17 the establishment of an armed force at least as large and strong as the *Bereitschaften* in East Germany, which numbers 60,000 men and is armed with

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tanks, it was not clear whether he was asking for a police force or an army. The West German force "must be strong enough to ward off any possible aggression by the Soviet zone People's Police (*Bereitschaften*) in the Korean manner," he stated. The American-British-French note of protest to the U.S.S.R. last May stated that the members of the People's Police "receive basic military training and are not employed on normal police duties. . . . A number of former high-ranking German army officers are employed in the force." In Washington on September 5 John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner, implied that the Eastern police force is in effect an army, which only an army could counter.

U.S. Defense of Germany

Even after the United States has consulted Britain and France, it cannot finally decide what kind of fighting force West Germany should be permitted to raise until it sets the role this country is to play in the maintenance of European security. Until now the Administration has assumed that our European allies, with the help of American matériel and counsel, will supply the bulk of manpower to guard their continent. The only forces the United States now assigns to Europe are the occupation troops in Germany and Austria, estimated at approximately 100,000 men, and the air squadrons based in Britain. Dr. Adenauer on August 17 requested the United States to strengthen its forces in Germany. "The people of West Germany fear that twice more their country may be subjected to scorched earth, once in an invasion by Russian troops and then again in liberation by the West," he said. "Such a fear can be dispelled only if more United States troops are established here." On August 31 President Truman said he had no plans for increasing American forces in West Germany. On September 9, apparently reversing his previous view, he announced that on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense he had approved proposals for "substantial increases" in the strength of United States forces in Western Europe. He added that "a basic element in the implementation of this decision is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard."

President Truman's new proposal has Republican backing, inasmuch as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts, a Republican leader in foreign affairs, on September 8 advocated the dispatch of ten United States divisions to Europe in order to reduce the likelihood of war. The ability of our allies to complement the Truman proposal soon, however, is debatable. Neither France nor Britain is ready now to increase the size of its national forces beyond the newly authorized levels or to establish a federated army and air force.

BLAIR BOLLES

What is Russia's Over-all Strategy Today?

Public interest in the United States has been focused with such intensity on Russia's UN Delegate Jacob A. Malik that relatively little attempt has been made to analyze the current strategy of the government for which he speaks. No one, even among the most fervently self-confessed ex-Communists, claims to have first-hand knowledge of Stalin's thinking. But, as a former Moscow correspondent of long experience, Alexander Werth, points out in *The Nation* of September 9, few public efforts are made to glean and sift such information as can be readily obtained from close study of Russian pronouncements at Lake Success and from broadcasts and newspaper stories addressed by Moscow to the Russian people.

Does Moscow Want War?

The most important single impression derived from these various sources is that the Kremlin, for the time being at least, is anxious to avoid a general war. Whether this attitude is due to fear of the atomic bomb—as Winston Churchill and some military leaders in Washington believe—or reluctance to have Russia again endure severe human and material losses five years after a devastating conflict from which it has by no means recovered, or from other reasons, such as conviction that it can win by political means short of war, depends on one's general estimate of Russian policy. There is little evidence that the Russian people are suffering from the atomic bomb jitters recently experienced here—perhaps because they know less than we do about the new weapon. But there is considerable evidence that the Russian men and women in the street dread another war when they are still toiling at tasks of reconstruction; and the long-term character of some of these tasks, notably irrigation and reforestation projects and new building programs, does not indicate that the country lives in daily expectation of a major conflict.

So far as can be determined, the Soviet government avoids statements at home that might create war hysteria—having apparently learned from an unhappy experience in the early post-war period that emphasis on war prospects, instead of arousing the anticipated enthusiasm, paralyzed the people's will to work. Where Soviet spokesmen place their emphasis is on the nefarious intentions of the United States, pictured as the sole source of aggression against the U.S.S.R. and the "people's democracies"—while the aims of Britain and France are discreetly soft-pedaled. The impression is thus created that if only America could be reduced in power, all danger would disappear, and Russia could proceed unhampered with the development of a peacetime economy.

The desire to avoid a general war evidenced by Moscow does not preclude the use of other methods to achieve the short- or long-term objectives of the U.S.S.R. Among these methods local conflicts in controversial areas, where native forces trained and equipped with the aid of Russia would challenge Washington's containment policy, may become more important than they have been considered in the past. Until Korea it seemed reasonable to assume—and was apparently assumed by State Department planners, since no significant preparations were made for a series of military operations along the periphery of the U.S.S.R.—that Stalin would act differently from Hitler and would not seek a military showdown with the Western powers, even in regions relatively distant from the United States where Russia might have good chances of winning.

The Korean conflict does not yet give cause to alter this over-all judgment. Moscow had no reason to believe that a North Korean invasion organized with its aid would encounter American opposition—for United States spokesmen had previously indicated that in their opinion South Korea was both indefensible and, from the point of view of this country's strategic interests, not worth defending. The prompt decision of the United States to resist aggression and to do so under the aegis of the United Nations apparently

came as a complete surprise to Moscow. While this may be regarded as a failure of Soviet intelligence services, it must be admitted that President Truman's move of June 25 also surprised the rest of the world, as well as most Americans. What the Russians thought was a calculated risk turned out to have been miscalculated.

While the Kremlin has denounced the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council during its seven-month boycott and has made every effort to expunge them from the record, it has not been insensible to world condemnation of the Korean invasion. It would be unrealistic to expect, as some observers do in this country, that Russia will publicly admit its error and withdraw from the position it has taken since June 25. It is with full knowledge that ways and means must be found for "saving face" for a great power that India, anxious to avert the spread of war, has made its so far abortive attempts to bring about discussion of the larger issues involved in Asia.

Three-Pronged Policy

While the U.S.S.R. may be expected to persist in its present course of avoiding a general war, it will probably continue and expand its three-pronged short-of-war policy. First it will keep on encouraging nationalist movements in Asia, placing the United States and the remaining colonial powers of Europe in the dilemma of either resisting nationalism or else accepting, for example in Indo-China, regimes inspired, if not necessarily enslaved, by Communist ideas. Second, it will probe "soft spots" along the far-flung periphery where it is contending for influence with the West, thus placing Communists like Marshal Tito or "reform" governments like that of General Ali Razmara in Iran in the dilemma of having to make a clear-cut choice between the two opposing sides when they would prefer to steer an independent course. This will also make it increasingly difficult for the West to concentrate its military and economic efforts on any one danger spot, thus dispersing the newly forged might of the United States which could otherwise be concentrated on the U.S.S.R. Yet should Americans demand "preventive war" against Russia, they will find little support among European and Asian nations which still hope to avert a general holocaust.

And, third, the U.S.S.R. remains convinced that sooner or later the complex economies of the Western nations will crack up under the strain of increased armaments, bringing severe inflation in its wake with resulting popular discontent climaxed by revolution. Over the long run Russia's most promising "secret weapon" may turn out to be not some extraordinarily powerful bomb but the simple fact, too often overlooked here, that while the Russian people have a low standard of living as compared with the West, every step forward they take, no matter how modest, represents improvement; while in Europe, where the workers' standard of living is nothing to boast about in American terms, any diminution in the output of housing and consumer goods will represent a depressing decline.

To meet this three-pronged policy without resort to war, the United States will need more than vastly expanded armaments. It will need far greater comprehension of nationalist aspirations in Asia than has yet been shown here, with more adequate economic aid to underdeveloped countries. President Truman's directive of September 8 to Secretary of State Dean Acheson initiating application of the Point Four program marks a step in the right direction. The United States, no matter how opposed it is to "socialism" or "nationalization" at home, will have to become accustomed to the idea that if economic reforms are to be carried out in underdeveloped countries, many changes tantamount to revolution will first have to be effected in their social and political structure. And this country will have to pay more attention than in the past to the economic and social problems of the poorer sectors of the population in Western Europe. It is not enough, as some American labor spokesmen have already pointed out, to give financial aid to the Marshall Plan countries if this aid then fails to filter down to the workers. Nor does it help anyone but Communist propagandists to take a "let-'em-eat-cake" attitude toward complaints of Europeans that more arms jeopardize recovery.

Such successes as the Kremlin has achieved in world affairs since 1945—and it must be borne in mind that it has made many blunders—have been due not solely to its own shrewdness and ingenuity. In part at least they have been due to lack of understanding by the Western powers of the forces shaping our fast-changing world. Instead of merely waiting to see what Moscow will do, and then doing the opposite, it might be well to decide what the West wants to see accomplished. This would both clarify the aims of the United Nations and strengthen their determination to achieve these aims.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Japan Peace Treaty Both Necessary and Hazardous

The Korean war has brought to a head the long-standing problem of finding some way to negotiate a peace settlement with Japan. Thus Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, on September 9 declared that "the time has come to move toward a Japanese peace settlement," and General Douglas MacArthur, consistent exponent of a treaty, affirmed as recently as September 1 that Japan was unconditionally qualified "to resume membership in good standing in the family of free nations." Communist aggression in Korea has greatly strengthened sentiment in Japan for a treaty accompanied by military guarantees against Russia, and the diversion of occupation forces to Korea has increased Washington's eagerness to build up Japan as an ally.

The United States is obligated by previous agreement to negotiate the peace treaty jointly with the Soviet Union as well as with other World War II allies. General acceptance of a treaty, however, appears most unlikely. In addition to the problem of Russia's insistence on the veto power in the negotiations and our unwillingness to exclude equal participation by all wartime allies against Japan—problems which have heretofore blocked even preliminary discussions—we now face the difficulty of determining who should represent China.

If over-all agreement cannot be reached, should the United States, in conjunction with the other Western allies, conclude a separate treaty with Japan? Persuasive arguments are offered in support of such a policy. The attempt to remodel Japan along democratic lines has reached a point where its chances for success will be seriously injured unless the occupation is promptly ended. The cost of the occupation and of American subsidies to the Japanese economy—some half billion dollars a year—might be cut from our overburdened national budget. If the Jap-

anese people are to provide effective aid to American forces in the event of Communist attack—an eventuality which appears more likely after the Korean invasion—they must be convinced that they are fighting in their own interests. They must also have a stable economy and probably some defense forces of their own. Some observers have seen the beginnings of such a force in the "national police reserve" of 75,000 men authorized by General MacArthur on July 8 to supplement the 125,000 local police now in uniform.

A Separate Peace Treaty

A debate has been raging in Japan itself between the proponents of neutrality, a separate peace and an over-all peace treaty. The Korean war brought a general shift in public opinion not only to support of a separate peace but also to acceptance of the idea of granting bases and rights of military movement to the United States. This position received official, although guarded, expression in the Japanese White Paper on Korea, issued on August 19, which declared that "to cooperate with the democracies and assist in strengthening their unity should be considered as nothing less than a measure for our own self-defense."

The conclusion of a separate peace, however, would give rise to many difficult problems — economic, military and political. The vast population of Japan, crowded into its small homeland, must depend on trade for raw materials and food to maintain even a minimum standard of living. The bulk of this trade, however, would naturally take place with the Asiatic mainland and especially with areas now under Chinese Communist control. In lieu of such trade—now politically inhibited—the United States has been providing a tremendous subsidy which, however, is as unpopular in Japan as it is with the American taxpayers. Yet only agreement with Peiping can clear the way for a viable, permanent solution to Japan's economic needs. Although China has much to gain by importing Japanese machinery and equipment, it does not need them so much as Japan needs coal, iron, soy beans and cotton from the mainland. Thus the Chinese would hold the whip hand in any commercial negotiations, being in a position to demand concessions beneficial to the Communist cause. Moreover, once trade has been restored, China could by a sudden embargo throw the Japanese economy into a catastrophic tail spin. The Russians also hold important economic counters—especially the fishing rights off the Siberian coast—which heretofore have been of basic importance in providing food for Japan.

These economic levers could be used by the Communists to further their joint interests as against Japan. Attention in this country has been focused on the possibility of conflicting interests between Russia and China over the northern provinces. But what has been largely overlooked, as Walter Lippmann recently pointed out, is the common interest of China and Russia in preventing the use of Korea by any off-shore power as a beachhead for the invasion of the mainland. The Japanese conquest of Korea, following the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, led directly to the occupation of Manchuria and then to the invasion of China proper, while from the same base Japan fought against Russia in 1905 and after World War I occupied eastern Siberia.

Chinese Reactions

The Sino-Soviet treaty of February 14, 1950 pledged the signatories to aid each other in the event of a "repetition" of aggression by Japan or any state united with it in such action. Thus the Communist move in Korea, by precipitating American —although UN-sponsored—action to defend the Korean Republic, has been portrayed in China as a revival of the classic form of Nipponese aggression. The fact that American forces came from Japan and that the Japanese have been rendering support from the rear serves to bolster these Chinese apprehensions. Should the United States now sign a separate peace with Tokyo and aid in the creation of a Japanese army, this will tend to confirm the Communist argument that Washington is planning imperialist aggression in Asia. Not only would this apparent confirmation help to dispel any Titoist doubts in Peiping, but it would reinforce the skepticism regarding Western objectives which is already prevalent throughout Asia.

A separate peace, moreover, would put the Communists in an excellent bargaining position. Not only could they reestablish trade with Japan, but they might offer to return the Kuriles and support the retrocession of the American-held Ryukyus, as well as promise a nonaggression treaty. In return they would demand concessions that would strengthen the Japanese Communists, weaken or eliminate Western military installations, and neutralize Japan as a whole. In such action they could count on support within Japan not only from outright Communists, but also from certain militarists, idealists and business men. If the Yoshida government, currently based on the parliamentary majority of its conservative Liberal party, should encounter acute post-treaty economic difficulties, as it well might, there could follow a swing of public opinion that would bring power, if not to the Communists, at least to the Socialists and other center groups who have not, as yet, committed themselves to a pro-Western orientation.

Some alternatives to a separate peace have been suggested, such as granting the Japanese government real autonomy without benefit of a formal treaty, or submitting the question to the United Nations. Whatever is done it seems clear that important as it may be to conclude a peace treaty with Japan, there are long range considerations affecting every facet of the Far Eastern situation which must be taken into consideration in reaching any decision.

FRED W. RIGGS

FPA Council Meeting

The autumn meetings of the FPA Council of Branches and Affiliates will take place at National Headquarters on September 22 and 23. Representatives will consider questions of policy, exchange experiences on local operations throughout the country and engage in round-table discussions.

Next Year in Jerusalem: The Story of Theodor Herzl, by Nina Brown Baker. New York, Harcourt, 1950. $2.50.

A popular biography of the founder of Zionism.

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